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2016年的第一场血 比2015年来的更早一些

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我以为我会哭,但是我没有。我只是怔怔望着熔断的速度,等待段子的安抚……

这何尝不是一种领悟,让我把A股看清楚。虽然那跌停的痛苦,将日日夜夜震荡在我灵魂最深处……

千股跌停泪未干,熔断推出且加餐。新年首秀万人观,完美收官无遗憾。满腔恨,几千般,资本原就多悲欢。江湖未是风波恶,别有A股行路难!

小编知道大家心里苦,先献出两个原创段子给大家解解渴。

上次段子秀已经是一个多月前了,小编真是想死你们了!

今天的情况,小编不多说,大家也知道了。上午不到10点,晓闻的评论已经是期待段子的读者们了!

duan8

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段7

段8

上午晓闻推出熔断机制介绍文章时,读者表示,费那劲整啥,“搞一把,同志们就立马明白了。”

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下午刚开盘,同志们已经按捺不住即将“见证历史”的期待和喜悦了!

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午后13:13分,千万股民一起见证了“历史性时刻”!A股新年首日触发熔断!

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2015年,我见证了千股跌停,千股涨停,千股停牌。本以为已走到了人生巅峰,没想到2016年开市第一天,我就亲身经历了熔断!!!!谁说炒股不值?!人家几十年都见不到的东西,中国股民一年已经就感受齐了!”

机构操盘手们利用宝贵的15分钟抓紧上厕所,备好啤酒饮料矿泉水,花生瓜子火腿肠……

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27分,交易恢复!操盘手们加速冲刺争取提前下班!!!

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努力触熔断,争取早下班!一定是放假三天没有玩够。听说2016年对交易员最“美好”的祝福是,明天九点半就可以下班。

努力触熔断,争取早下班!一定是放假三天没有玩够!

熔断无难事,只要肯测试。A股史上首次熔断测试空前成功!程序交易员们交出完美答卷!

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全国股民纷纷发来贺电庆祝熔断测试成功,仅用半天便牢记熔断规则,再也不敢忘了!“记住了吗?”“记住了。”“真记住了?”“真记住了。”“好,那我再让你记牢一点。”

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交易员们欢天喜地回家去!带头执行国家政策!

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股民们下班了,段子手登场。

终于当了一会库里,提前打卡下班了!

屌丝乘车将欲行,忽闻满仓跌停声。

“断了的线,再怎么连。我的钱包,你已看不见。”

证券工作真是好,其他行业比不了。牛市时候挣钱多,熊市时候下班早。

“断了的线,再怎么连。我的钱包,你已看不见。”证券工作真是好,其他行业比不了。牛市时候挣钱多,熊市时候下班早。

人民币跌,说我先来,你们随意。A股说,you jump, I jump,我只会爱得比你多。

小编笑中带泪,不能自已。

jump,我只会爱得比你多。小编笑中带泪,不能自已。

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春眠不觉晓 处处跌停鸟。也无风雨也无晴,直接熔断你最行。

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第一次果然很痛,麻麻没有骗我!

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听说券商女员工的婚嫁之路从此改变了。未来券商女员工将远超过公务员,教师,白领,最终站上婚恋市场顶峰。9点45,她们拿出打毛衣针为你织一条秋裤。2点,她们坐着空荡的地铁。5点,她为在路上的你做出了一桌可口晚餐。

1

千股跌停辞旧岁,万众跳楼迎新年!

第一次果然很痛,麻麻没有骗我!

听说券商女员工的婚嫁之路从此改变了。未来券商女员工将远超过公务员,教师,白领,最终站上婚恋市场顶峰。9点45,她们拿出打毛衣针为你织一条秋裤。2点,她们坐着空荡的地铁。5点,她为在路上的你做出了一桌可口晚餐。

小编深深的记住了!炒股前一定看黄历!

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今天有人批评小编,别尼玛再说见证历史性一刻了好吗?当初第一次千股跌停时候你咋说的?对此,小编只想表示,不苦中作乐难道去死么?敢问去年股灾后哪个天台不需要提前半年预约!

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跨年的时候,小编装了把文艺。

2015年的最后一天。 

霾一早就散了,我对着K线图死磕。 

大盘最终定格为绿。 忧伤弥散,段子无力。

我推开窗,久违的阳光打在脸上。 

那些惊惶、怨恨、焦灼、无力,都沉淀在心底。

我告诉自己起码听到了许多段子、学会了许多道理。 

来年,我还有一个愿望。

来年,我还有一个梦想。

不再做韭菜,稳稳抄底。 

太阳照常升起。

然而今天小编再次明白老人家讲的真理,天若有情天亦老,做人开心才最好。

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小编心里也苦,但小编只看段子。小编有个梦想,从明天起,做个有志气的人,减肥、挣钱、跑过大盘。写完段子,春暖花开。

好了,小编听大家的话,做个有志气的人,写完段子下班!亲亲亲耐滴们,新任小编的段子处女秀,您看完美嘛?

(更多精彩财经资讯,点击这里下载华尔街见闻App)

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neoszc
994 days ago
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这是2016的一个故事
neoszc
888 days ago
是的
neoszc
888 days ago
好大呀
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金融改革:2016年可以期待什么?

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中国资本市场经历了不平静的2015,“牢牢守住不发生系统性风险”也成为高层口中频繁强调的政策底线。习近平主席在“四个歼灭战”中提出的“防范化解金融风险”,不仅会成为近日召开的中央经济工作会议的重要内容,更将成为明年金融系统改革和政策布局的方向。

中金公司今日发布报告,称金融改革仍将是2016年中国政策议程上最重要的议题之一,金融改革将是供给侧改革的重要组成部分

随着人民币发挥在SDR中的职能,包括资本在内的生产要素市场成为推进供给侧改革的重点领域,中国明年也将担任G20轮值主席国。要在全球经济和金融治理中发挥更加积极的作用,中国自身金融体系势必需与国际标准进一步衔接,与国际金融体系进一步融合。

中金对明年具体的改革措施作出的预测包括:

资本账户开放

虽然中国致力于进一步开放资本账户,但具体进度将取决于市场条件。鉴于资本流出压力,在节奏上,对资本流入管制的放松可能会快于对资本流出管制的放松。中金称,2016年可能推出的资本账户开放措施包括:

在自贸区实行限额内资本项目可兑换;推出“深港通”;

允许非居民在国内市场发行(更多)金融产品,尤其是熊猫债券;拓宽外国投资者参与银行间债券和外汇市场的渠道;

推出合格境内个人投资者(QDII2)试点计划;进一步扩大 QFII、RQFII 和 QDII 计划的参与者群体、投资范围和投资额度。

汇率改革

尽管央行本月通过外汇交易中心推出了 CFETS 人民币汇率指数,但中金认为,人民币对美元双边汇率对市场来说仍是最重要的指标央行可能会在增加人民币汇率弹性的同时,保持人民币币值基本稳定。央行可能通过以下几种方式增加人民币汇率弹性:

在市场平稳的情况下逐步退出常态式干预;

接受汇率更大范围内的实际波动,在超出时再进行干预

进一步扩大每日波动区间。

更重要的是发展外汇市场。中金认为,央行有必要放宽外汇市场准入、发展新的对冲工具并将远期曲线延长至更长期限预计人民币汇率将呈现更多双向波动,但不会大幅贬值。央行势必会采取措施进一步消除人民币在岸和离岸间汇差,减少跨境套利活动,也便于SDR机制运作。

利率市场化和货币政策改革

在存款利率上限管制被取消后,央行可能采取具体措施,着手构建一个走廊机制以有效引导银行间市场利率。央行应确定一个合适的政策利率,中金预计回购利率将担任这一角色

借贷便利的利率或面临更加频繁的调整,以形成有效的利率上限。法定和超额存款准备金的利率也可能发生调整,以形成有效的利率下限。

此外,中国货币市场的利率期限结构尚不完备,阻碍了货币政策的有效传导,因此有必要增加 3 个月至 1年期货币市场工具(如国债和大额存单)的发行与交易。

货币政策之外,央行可能会赋予银行在存贷款定价方面更大的灵活性。因此,窗口指导在未来或逐步淡出,银行利率差异化趋势或更加明显。

资本市场改革

注册制明年将正式推行并逐步完善。对于今年火热的债市,中金表示交易所市场与银行间市场的分割仍是需要逐步加以解决的一个关键问题。如果划拨国有资本充实社保得以实施,社保基金将可以发挥其作为专业机构投资者的优势,减少中国资本市场的投资氛围和散户驱动的情况。中国资本市场国际化加速的趋势,可能的形式包括与国外交易所的合作,或者创设国际版(尤其是在自贸区)。

监管体系改革

今年股市的震荡及近来P2P风险加剧都引发了加强金融监管及可能形式的讨论。中金认为,虽然是否应设立一个超级监管机构还有待商榷,加强监管协调以及监管的适度集中肯定是必要的,央行或许可在其中发挥一个更加主导的作用。

另外,中国或将逐步打破“刚性兑付”,以实现风险的准确定价。随着政府坚定解决工业产能过剩问题的决心,在没有系统性风险的情况下可能会允许更多的债务违约和机构倒闭。

(更多精彩财经资讯,点击这里下载华尔街见闻App)

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neoszc
1008 days ago
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4 Telltale Signs The Credit Cycle Is Turning Now

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Earlier today, the FT wrote an article in which it found that "companies have defaulted on $78bn worth of debt so far this year, according to Standard & Poor’s, with 2015 set to finish with the highest number of worldwide defaults since 2009" which together with a chart we have been showing for the past year, namely the staggering disconnect between junk bond yields and the S&P500...

... has made many wonder if the credit cycle - a key leading indicator to economic inflection points and in the case of the last credit bubble, the Great Financial Crisis - has already turned. According to a recent analysis by Ellington Management, the answer is a resounding yes.

Below, we present what Ellington believes are the 4 telltale sings the credit cycle is turning now. The full report is a must read for everyone (link here) but for those who wish to know where the overall debt market is headed, the below excerpt is a must read, especially since as Ellington concludes, once "fickle investors exit the market, high yield bonds and leveraged loan prices should settle at a supply/demand equilibrium well below today's levels."

* * *

Telltale Signs the Credit Cycle is Turning Now

We believe that we are now at the end of the "over-investment" phase of the corporate credit cycle in the US that has been playing out since the depths of the GFC. This view is supported by a number of telltale signs of a reversal in the credit cycle:

  1. Worsening Fundamentals - Declining corporate pro ts, record levels of corporate leverage, and an elevated high yield share of total corporate debt issuance
  2. Defaults/Downgrades - Credit rating downgrades at a pace not seen since 2009
  3. Falling Asset Prices - Price deterioration in the lowest quality loans and the most junior CLO tranches
  4. Tightening Lending Standards - Weak investor appetite for new distressed debt issues, declines in CLO and CCC HY bond issuance, and tightening in domestic bank lending standards

The turn of the credit cycle from expansion to contraction tends to play out the same way each time. Initial enthusiasm about a new technology, innovation, or policy change creates an investment boom and easier lending standards. This virtuous cycle repeats itself, with stronger fundamentals, lower volatility, and higher leverage. Financial markets facilitate increased leverage, magnifying booms and busts. Return-chasing investors pile in, fueling more debt issuance. Borrowers who would have otherwise defaulted are able to refinance as leverage increases faster than cash flows deteriorate. Over-investment inevitably leads to loans that go sour, and as the tide of leverage goes out, the full extent of irresponsible lending becomes apparent. The previously virtuous cycle between risk spreads and fundamentals goes into reverse, with lower prices, defaults, and downgrades forcing leveraged investors to sell, leading to even lower prices.

As we have shown, the demand for high yield assets today is fickle. Once these fickle investors exit the market, high yield bonds and leveraged loan prices should settle at a supply/demand equilibrium well below today's levels.

 

Telltale Sign #1: Worsening Fundamentals

As we noted earlier, corporations are now running out of steam in terms of their ability to generate earnings. As of Q2 2015, the year-over-year change in annual corporate earnings dropped to -$8.21 per share for the S&P 500 and to -$4.79 per share for the Russell 2000. The previous three times this metric fell that far into negative territory on the S&P 500 were Q1 1990, Q1 2001, and Q4 2007, coinciding with the start of each of the last three high yield default cycles. According to a recent article in The Economist, in the most recent quarter less than half of S&P 500 companies recorded increasing pro ts year-over-year.

The average quality of corporate debt issuance has also deteriorated in the past few years. Recent research documents a strong link between issuer quality in corporate debt markets and excess returns over the following 1-3 years. This empirical finding holds when credit quality is measured both in terms of credit spreads (market implied default probability) as well as credit ratings. Our research suggests the lag may be slightly longer, with high HY issuance fractions in 1996-1998 and 2003-2004 being followed by default waves in 2000-2003 and 2009-2011. Again, we believe that the root cause of lower issuer quality in recent years is lower interest rates. First, as central banks have purchased massive amounts government bonds and MBS, they push investors into risky assets that they would not otherwise buy. Second, a declining interest rate environment is helpful to corporate balance sheets, thus creating the illusion that lower default rates are evidence of improving corporate fundamentals.

Since 2010, the HY fraction of total corporate debt issuance has been at or above levels that preceded the last two waves of corporate credit defaults (see Figure 11 below). What is remarkable about today's high HY fraction of debt issuance is not only its level but also its persistence. Unlike the past corporate credit booms of 1997-1999 and 2003-2005, HY companies have faced a very friendly environment of zero short-term borrowing rates and declining long-term interest rates. This has made the most recent credit cycle more extreme and of longer duration than past cycles. Moreover, because the relationship we document between the HY fraction of issuance and future returns has been during a declining rate environment, the predicted excess return over Treasuries is even lower on a duration-adjusted basis.

 

Telltale Sign #2: Defaults/Downgrades

Many credit investors have mandates to invest only in bonds with minimum ratings provided by the rating agencies. S&P issued 108 downgrades for US non-financial companies in August and September and 297 downgrades YTD, the most in a two-month period since May-June 2009 and the most in a year since 2009.

Downgrades create a perverse supply problem for high yield. Even if issuance were to shut down, downgrades from investment grade to high yield and from high yield to distressed create net new supply in the lower tier sectors. This is relevant because the investors who play in the high yield and investment grade debt markets are two largely disjointed groups. Since there is a lot more investment grade paper outstanding than high yield, downgrades could potentially present even more of a supply issue for the high yield market than high yield issuance.

Ratings downgrades can have immediate impacts on securitized debt as CLOs and other products have ratings provisions that determine how cash flows are allocated to different investors in a securitization. For example, ratings downgrades can shut o ff payments to the bottom of the capital structure of many CLOs. The size limit on loans rated CCC and below is typically 7.5%. The average CLO exposure to CCC and below is currently up to 4.3% from 2.3% two years ago, while the fraction of CLO holdings just one notch above CCC has remained around 20-25% since 2009.14 If only a fraction of these near-CCC holdings is downgraded, the 7.5% limit will be exceeded, which will trigger a haircut to be applied to the collateral for the purpose of overcollateralization (OC) tests. Once a CLO fails the OC tests, cash flows are diverted away from equityholders.

Because CLOs now absorb 70% of leveraged loan demand, the pricing of par loans will experience a quantum jump down to a new equilibrium level if 70% of demand is taken away. Not only will a halt in CLO issuance lead to a drop in leveraged loan demand, it will also create short-term supply pressures from liquidations of CLO warehouses for deals that did not get done. A number of CLO warehouses are significantly underwater today. We expect to see selling pressure from these warehouses as we approach year-end, especially given the pricing pressure on leveraged loans that has persisted since August. We saw the same dynamics when the ABSCDO and CLO markets shut down abruptly during the GFC

 

Telltale Sign #3: Falling Asset Prices

Late last year, the first cracks in the high yield edifice began to show with the decline in oil prices. This led to a decline in high yield bond prices, but losses were contained mostly to the Energy sector. As concerns about China weakness intensified this past summer, Metals & Mining also began to feel the heat. However, as Figure 14 shows, while the returns in the Oil & Gas and Basic Materials sectors (the latter of which includes Metals & Mining) have been disastrous over the past year, the rest of the HY bond market is actually up YTD. Moreover, the relative decline in Oil & Gas and Basic Materials has been a slow bleed on a beta-adjusted basis versus the whole sector. While we have seen market jitters, contagion in HY has yet to really extend beyond industries directly impacted by lower oil prices.

One can tell the same story with distressed versus non-distressed high yield sectors. Figure 15 shows the cumulative performance of the S&P US High Yield Corporate Bond Index versus the S&P US Distressed High Yield Corporate Bond Index. Again, the effects of initial fundamental weakness among the most distressed high yield borrowers have not yet percolated up to stronger credits. This suggests to us that it is not too late to get out now.

It is not just Energy and Basic Materials names that are contributing to poor distressed returns today. As Table 1 shows, in 2015 most distressed industry groups are seeing underperformance versus high yield.

Individual sector weakness may at first seem like an isolated issue. However, the contagion process has already been set in motion as the riskiest segments of high yield now trade at multi-year wides. Investors in these assets include distressed investors, leveraged buyers of junior credit index and bespoke tranches, CLO mezz and equity investors, and buyers of new issue Energy sector debt this past spring. Not only are the most leveraged sectors usually the first to crack, but the most leveraged investors tend to have greatest exposure to these sectors. As these investors de-lever, price pressures induce the next round of deleveraging in a negative feedback loop.

As shown in Figure 16, spreads on more senior new-issue CLO tranches (AAA through A) are below their recent trailing averages, while riskier new-issue tranches (BB through B) have widened substantially since July. The same divergence can be observed in the high yield bond market in Figure 17, where lower rated CCC collateral has widened versus B-rated collateral to levels not seen since the GFC.

 

Telltale Sign #4: Tightening Lending Standards

The marginal buyers in credit markets are the ones who set underwriting standards. Their losses mean that credit conditions are already tightening, and this resetting of underwriting standards is consistent with the high number of deals pulled in October. More generally, cov-lite deals are much harder to get done now. A number of new deals are being done, but with lower fees and wider spreads on the junior mezz tranches.

As loan issuance has declined, so have the prospects for M&A among the riskiest borrowers. In recent months, banks that extended loans to high yield companies to finance buyouts are now unable to sell those loans to investors, who have become skittish about the worst quality high yield debt. We are seeing the immediate effects of this lack of a bid as banks who hold these loans on balance sheet must sell them by year-end in order to avoid significant capital charges, resulting in forced sales at a loss. The risk-averse behaviors of banks since the GFC suggest to us that banks will be much less inclined to underwrite risky deals going forward after suffering such losses.

Recent trends in bank lending standards for corporate loans also demonstrate that tightening is underway, and this has historically been a strong predictor of high yield corporate default rates. As shown in Figure 18 below, there has been an 89% correlation over the past 25 years between changes in bank lending standards and speculative grade corporate defaults a year forward. This predictive relationship is strongly statistically signi cant, even after controlling for lagged default rates. This 89% correlation is much higher than the contemporaneous correlation of 62% between the two measures, suggesting that tightening lending standards drive defaults higher. In the third quarter of 2015, a net 7.4% of banks tightened lending standards for commercial and industrial loans, the tightest reading since 2009. While today's tightening in lending standards looks somewhat similar to that in 2011, that blip was more of a head-fake from the Euro crisis, and was therefore a short-term period of uncertainty originating from outside the corporate credit markets, compared to today's tightening where the major source of lender uncertainty is coming from corporate credit itself.

The predictive power of changes in lending standards suggests that tightening lending standards directly impact future default rates, as companies have difficulty rolling over debt. This demonstrates the mechanism by which contagion spreads from a few isolated sectors to all of high yield. As a few sectors underperform, banks experience write-downs and losses, which leads them to tighten overall lending standards. This leads to broader weakness, perpetuating a feedback loop that triggers a default cycle. An imminent Fed hiking cycle today is yet another reason to expect bank lending standards to continue to tighten.

Deteriorating corporate fundamentals would be less of a concern in the short run if investors chose to ignore the fundamentals, but our distressed loan traders have been seeing the opposite. Investor appetite for risky loans has fallen off a cliff . We give four examples from the distressed sector, followed by some sobering statistics from the CLO market.

First, Millennium Labs' leveraged loan was trading at par in April. The loan fell to $50 in June following  allegations that the company was defrauding the government and would have to pay a fine of unknown magnitude. The loan facility is relatively large, at $1.775B in size. A few weeks ago, a block of $20 million (1% of total issuance) became available. Market chatter was around a price of $35 (30% below the market level at the time), for a total of $7 million in proceeds. Even at this steep discount, the block did not clear as the sourcing desk could not find enough buyers.

Second, recent new issues in October have priced very wide to talk or have been pulled altogether. Four deals were pulled in October alone, including SiteOne, Xerium Technologies, Apple Leisure Group, and ABB Optical Group. Other deals are coming out very wide relative to price talk. Fullbeauty Brands had two term loans price recently, with initial talk at $99 and L+450 for an $820 million first lien, and $98 and L+850 for the second lien. These two loans ended up pricing at $93 and L+475 and $87 and L+900, respectively (the latter at a 13.2% yield!). In each of these cases, the banks syndicating these loan transactions were stung
with losses on the loans. Even for deals that eventually clear, banks have been quick to respond to such losses by tightening terms for new issues.

Third, we see weak investor appetite in combination with financial that appear to be managed to slide in just under the radar of regulatory scrutiny. Builders First Source came to market with a deal in April 2015 that was exactly 6.0x Debt/EBITDA, using a pro-forma EBITDA methodology that contained numerous add-backs, which added around $50 million to arrive at a final EBITDA number of $376 million. Excluding these add-backs, leverage would have been at 6.9x, above the 6.0x maximum level that the Federal Reserve and the OCC deemed to be prudent underwriting standards.

Fourth, on September 15th, Moody's downgraded Sprint's senior unsecured debt from B2 to Caa1. Fears of downgrades by the other rating agencies to CCC, which would impact portfolio managers' CCC concentration limits, drove pricing on Sprint's $2.5 billion of bonds maturing in 2028 from $88.40 the day before the downgrade to $80.80 two days later. Being one of the largest names in the high yield universe with $30 billion in total debt outstanding, this price shock was felt across debt markets. While prices eventually recovered, such large price swings on a single ratings downgrade show the extent to which investors have been willing to sell debt at the first signs of trouble.

Adding to this anecdotal evidence, there is an overall trend this year of declining issuance in lower-rated US HY corporate credit. As shown in Figure 19 below, total US CCC issuance this year stands at $30B on an annualized basis as of the end of October, down 48% from its peak of $58B in 2013. In contrast, overall US HY corporate debt issuance has fallen only 16% over the same period.

The CLO market has also exhibited recent signs of weakness on both the supply and demand side. In terms of supply, leveraged loan issuance is down more than a third year over year and since June, and the rate of US CLO issuance has fallen to half the 2014 rate (Figure 20). Pricing on new-issue CLO equity has weakened substantially given the weakness in high yield Energy, Metals & Mining, and Power/Utilities. Weakness in one sector is enough to make equity and BB tranches risky enough to lack a bid, which should impair CLO issuance.

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neoszc
1028 days ago
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看!那些大鳄们都在干什么!

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对冲基金大佬们的2015并不惬意。华尔街此前提及,高盛报告称,今年8~10月的三个月,对冲基金最爱的股票组合表现远远落后于美股大盘,相对表现创2002年有记录以来第二糟,仅好于2008年金融危机时。本月稍早公布的Ackman的Pershing Square今年以来回报率仅为-21.2%。

不过,大佬毕竟是大佬。通常情况下,别人输,他们赢。别人赢,他们赢得更多。

据财经资讯服务商FactSet,对冲基金大幅减持AT&T和苹果公司的股票,仅三季度排名前50的对冲基金就减持了约32亿美元的美国电话电报公司(AT&T)股票。Discovery Capital Management, Citadel Advisors, D.E. Shaw Group, Millennium Management, EgertonCapital等主要对冲基金每家均减持了约1亿美元的苹果公司股票。

HedgeFundProjects

尽管AT&T和苹果的市值没有剧烈波动,但因大佬们的减持,两家公司都没有在近期美股的复苏中反弹至夏季的高位。

减持了AT&T和苹果,排名前50的对冲基金大佬们三季度增持了约163亿美元的医药保健股,尤其是梯瓦(Teva Pharmaceutical)和艾尔建(Allergan)。这两只股票今年迄今表现均好于AT&T和苹果。

BigPharmFinds

分析认为,三季度大幅重仓增持医药保健股将帮助对冲基金“力挽狂澜”,在年末临近之际提高全年收益率。

(更多精彩财经资讯,点击这里下载华尔街见闻App)

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neoszc
1028 days ago
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人民币四天来首次收涨 最后16分钟成交量占全天近三成

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在连续贬值三天后,人民币今天小幅反弹。

在岸人民币兑美元即期汇率再现尾盘拉涨,收盘上涨0.11%,报6.3918元,这是自周二人民币暴跌以来首次收涨。

今日人民币成交额减少11.4%,报261.16亿美元;据彭博数据计算,最后16分钟成交占全天交易量近三成。

在连续贬值三天后,人民币今天小幅反弹。

在岸人民币兑美元即期汇率再现尾盘拉涨,收盘上涨0.11%,报6.3918元,这是自周二人民币暴跌以来首次收涨。

今日人民币成交额减少11.43%,报261.12亿美元;据彭博数据计算,最后16分钟成交占全天交易量近三成。

QQ图片20150814174338

彭博援引两位银行交易员称,临近收盘时看到至少两家中资大行大举抛售美元,并伴随着即期成交放量。

这与前两天的走势较为相似,昨日在岸人民币尾盘快速上扬,跌幅迅速收窄至0.19%,并且自去年11月份来首次高于央行设定的中间价。

人民币企稳与央行新闻发布会上的表态紧密相关,当天央行官员称,有能力保持人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上的基本稳定,且人民币汇率经过两天的调整,逐渐向市场化水平回归,3%左右的累积贬值压力得到一次性释放,此前偏差校正已经基本完成。

周五人民币兑美元中间价报6.3975;上日中间价报6.4010,收报6.3990。这是人民币中间价四天来首次走高。

国泰君安分析师任泽平在最近的报告中指出,人民币贬值短期接近尾声,央行会死守中间价6.50的底线,且在央行的可控范围内。

本周在岸人民币贬值幅度为2.93%,与央行认为的3%偏差基本一致。周二在岸人民币跌幅为1.87%,为1994年人民币官方与市场汇率并轨以来的最大单日跌幅。周三跌幅为0.95%,周四跌幅收窄至0.19%。

QQ图片20150814175901

(更多精彩财经资讯,点击这里下载华尔街见闻App)

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neoszc
1137 days ago
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Maybe you should be afraid of Google

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One of the big stories in my small world over the past week or so has been the layoffs at MetaFilter. Matt Haughey broke the news in a MetaTalk post on the state of the site. Here’s the bottom line:

While MetaFilter approaches 15 years of being alive and kicking, the overall website saw steady growth for the first 13 of those years. A year and a half ago, we woke up one day to see a 40% decrease in revenue and traffic to Ask MetaFilter, likely the result of ongoing Google index updates. We scoured the web and took advice of reducing ads in the hopes traffic would improve but it never really did, staying steady for several months and then periodically decreasing by smaller amounts over time.

The long-story-short is that the site’s revenue peaked in 2012, back when we hired additional moderators and brought our total staff up to eight people. Revenue has dropped considerably over the past 18 months, down to levels we last saw in 2007, back when there were only three staffers.

Today, he posted more details on Medium, both about the drop in revenue and Google’s recent classification of MetaFilter as a content farm. This has been happening to other reputable blogs as well. I haven’t gotten any of these requests, or if I have, they have gone unread.

I don’t really think of Google as a monopolist, but it is true that Google holds the fate of any number of Internet businesses in their hands. This is true whether they rely on Google-served ads for revenue, or they rely on organic search traffic from Google to grow their visitor base. I oftentimes tell people that Google is to Internet businesses what like weather is to farmers. You can have fertile soil, plant the right crops, and run your farm incredibly well, but if it doesn’t rain, you’re not going to have anything to harvest in the end. By the same token, if Google makes a change that directs traffic away from your site, you’ll find yourself in the same situation as MetaFilter.

That’s scary. I don’t really have any solutions to propose, but the degree to which the Web publishing industry has become almost wholly dependent depended on Google demands more attention.

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samuel
1586 days ago
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Base your business on a single company and you're bound to get tied up in that single company's business.
The Haight in San Francisco
StunGod
1585 days ago
Right, but what are the options? it's not so much that Metafilter based their business on Google as it is that because they're an internet content company, Google is the default way that their customers will find them. I like the weather analogy, and think that's probably the best description of the relationship.
futurile
1585 days ago
I have to agree with @StunGod Google is so important now that many Internet businesses are deaf to based on them. Ultimately, that is the basis of the publishers complaint in the EU and it's worth reading some of the commentary from that to get a European perspective on options.
peterdoerrie
1585 days ago
There are alternatives: Sites like Buzzfeed have diversified by putting effort into spreading via Facebook and other social networks. If anything, I think that Google's influence on content discovery has diminished over the last years because of entities like Facebook. And regarding the EU publisher thing: As a European journalist, my personal opinion is that the publishers are trying to litigate their way to the honey pot because they have ignored the digital revolution completely.
neoszc
1553 days ago
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